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Abstract 
This paper investigates how physicians in Japan changed the quantity of medical 
services provided to patients in response to the move from a fixed to a proportional co-
payment system for the elderly. A physician–patient interaction model is proposed 
where a physician first decides the quantity of medical services. The patient then sets 
the number of visits. The paper empirically analyzes whether physicians actually 
changed the quantity of medical services associated with the co-payment scheme, and if 
so, in which particular services. The results indicate that a physician provides more 
services to patients whose co-payment would decrease following the reform, and less to 
patients whose co-payment would increase. This is achieved through changing the 
quantity of laboratory testing and/or diagnostic imaging. 
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1. Introduction 
Most OECD countries that adopt public health systems have suffered from a surge 
in public spending for health care services. In particular, spending for the elderly is 
rapidly growing because of aging populations. As in many other countries, Japan has a 
health service system for the elderly and has experienced growing pressure on the costs 
of sustaining this system. In an attempt to control public spending in this area, 
governments in Japan have gradually increased out-of-pocket payments, or co-payments, 
for elderly patients. 
In general, persons more than 70 years old are eligible to benefit from the health 
services system. One of the main features of the system is that the elderly pay lower co-
payments than those under 70 years of age. In 2000, a proportional co-payment scheme 
was introduced, whereby the elderly became obliged to share 10 percent of the total 
monthly medical fee, in place of a per-visit fixed co-payment in the prereform scheme 
where the monthly co-payment was unrelated to the monthly fee. The rationale was that 
the increase in patients’ cost-share leads to a decrease in patient visits and thus reduces 
the total medical fee. In fact, if patient visits are elastic with respect to the co-payment 
rate, this reform will reduce overall government spending for health care of the elderly. 
The reform, however, may not depress the number of visits immediately, even if 
demand is elastic. One reason is that the effects of the reform are not necessarily the 
same for all elderly patients. There are potentially two types of patients in this regard: 
the first is a patient whose co-payment would increase, while the second is a patient 
whose co-payment would decrease after the reform if treatment were unchanged. For 
example, a patient whose total medical fee per visit is no more than 5000 yen (about 
US$45) would pay less in co-payments than they did before the reforms and may 
therefore increase the number of visits. Whether the reform actually reduces the number 
of visits by the elderly depends on the relative population size of the two types of 
patient. Put differently, if the population of the first type is larger than the second, the 
reform will fail in reducing public spending for elderly health care. 
A more important point to be considered is how physicians respond to the reform 
because it is not sufficient to focus only on patient visits. If the reform reduces the 
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demand for health care services, it would also decrease physicians’ income. A physician 
concerned with pecuniary incentives may then attempt to mitigate the negative effects 
of the reform by controlling both the number of patient visits and the type of treatment 
received. 
Particularly in elderly health care, a physician is likely to know a patient’s demand 
function, and thus how the change of co-payment affects the patient’s visits. In general, 
elderly diseases are chronic, but not serious. Representative diseases include high blood 
pressure or troubles with joints, which are not acute but sometimes cause difficulties in 
patients’ daily lives. They may also lead to more serious diseases in the long run. As 
chronic diseases are relevant to patients’ lifestyles, patients tend to inform their 
physician so the physician becomes aware of their health condition. As a result, patients 
will not easily move away from a well-informed physician. As physicians know about 
their elderly patients’ lifestyles, they may also understand their way of thinking, and 
sometimes the value of their assets or income. Thus, a physician may be able to predict 
whether the reform will encourage or discourage a patient to visit because the patient’s 
demand function for medical services is known. 
Furthermore, since the physician sets the medical fee, and given the fee-for-service 
reimbursement scheme in Japan, the physician also knows each patient’s 10 percent co-
payment. The physician can then mitigate the negative income effects of the reform by 
giving more medical services to a patient whose co-payment will fall, and less to a 
patient whose co-payment would rise if treatments were left unchanged. Thus, 
physicians can maintain their income, even when the demand for health care services is 
elastic with respect to the co-payment rate. This implies the reform may have little role 
in reducing total medical fees. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to propose a simple physician–
patient interaction model to explain both patient visits and physician provision of 
medical services. The second purpose is to examine empirically how behavior has 
changed following the reform and whether it is consistent with the expectations of the 
model. We assume that patients and physicians maximize their respective utilities (or 
payoffs) and that there is a two-stage decision-making process where the physician 
moves first followed by the elderly patient. In this model, the physician decides the 
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quantities of medical services using the known demand function of the patient in the 
first stage; in the second stage, the patient decides how many times he or she will visit 
the doctor each month, given the quantities of medical services provided by the 
physician. The physician can then control the number of visits via the quantity of 
provided services to maximize the payoff. 
With the physician–patient interaction model, we anticipate that physicians will 
provide more medical services to patients whose co-payment falls, and less to patients 
whose co-payment rises, in order to maximize their own payoff. This has already been 
proven, as there are a number of papers that suggest physicians change treatment when 
the prices of medical services are changed by reforms to the fee schedule. For example, 
Nguyen and Derrick (1997) and Yip (1998) show the possibilities for changes in the 
supply side when Medicare prices are reduced. In particular, we establish that 
physicians control the quantity of medical services by changing the frequency of 
laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging. 
This analysis is novel in considering the interaction between physicians and elderly 
patients in a two-stage model based on the Japanese health care system. A number of 
studies have examined physician behavior from the viewpoint of demand inducement in 
a fee-for-service reimbursement scheme or patient behavior from a moral hazard point 
of view. However, only a few studies have discussed the interaction between physicians 
and patients (Lien et al., 2004). Ma and McGuire’s (1997) examination of physician–
patient interaction (rationing, effort or persuasion) is a rare example. Our study is 
inspired by these analyses to model the interaction in the Japanese public health system, 
which is different from that of the United States. We incorporate two kinds of medical 
services into the model to examine which kind of services a physician changes when 
changing the quantity of services provided. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains briefly the public health 
insurance system in Japan and provides a literature survey. Section 3 introduces the 
physician–patient interaction model and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 
5 concludes. 
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2. Background and Previous Literature 
In the 1970s, an elderly health care system was introduced in Japan to help the aged 
visit doctors more easily as with Medicare in the US. Initially, there was no co-payment 
for the elderly, defined as more than 70 years old. While the free provision of medical 
services by the government improved the health conditions of the aged, it resulted in 
large deficits in the public health insurance budget. In the 1980s, the free-provision 
policy was abandoned and a fixed co-payment scheme was introduced. However, even 
with the fixed co-payment scheme, elderly patients paid only a small amount of money 
per month for many expensive medical services. In 2000, a proportional co-payment 
scheme was adopted to reduce the increase in public medical spending for the aged. 
Before these reforms, an outpatient was required to pay 530 yen (about US$5) per visit 
for up to four visits, costing about 2120 yen (nearly US$20) per month, and was not 
required to pay any more, even with more than five visits. After the reform, patients are 
now required to pay 10 percent of the total fee, although there is still an upper limit for 
co-payments per month. 
We note that competition between medical institutions in Japan is severe and this 
also influences physicians’ behavior. For example, hospitals that provide both primary 
and advanced health care services compete against clinics. In the Japanese health 
system, there is no strict separation in the medical services provided by institutions, 
clinics or hospitals. There is also no distinction between general practitioners and 
specialists and no separation of hospital fees from doctors’ fees. Furthermore, there is 
no set criteria for attending a hospital or clinic, so patients may choose either, regardless 
of the seriousness of their illness. Since hospitals compete against clinics (typically run 
by general practitioners), physicians in hospitals will try to prevent their patients 
moving to a competitor by keeping patients’ utilities greater than their reservation 
utilities. 
We will now discuss how this study is related to previous work. Patients may 
consume excess health services if they are insured, called an ex post moral hazard. The 
ex post moral hazard may be controlled by letting patients bear some portion of the total 
medical cost. As discussed above, an increase in the co-payment rate may not actually 
decrease the number of visit to doctors. Manning et al. (1987), using RAND 
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experimental data, reported that the demand for medical services is rather inelastic with 
respect to the co-payment rate (see Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment Group 
(1993) for details). Chiappori et al. (1998) studied the effects of an increase in the co-
payment rate on patient visits using French data; Cockx and Brasseur (2003) did the 
same using Belgian data, and Yoshida and Takagi (2002) using Japanese data. The 
effects found were a general decrease in demand, but these were small and limited to a 
specific medical service (Chiappori et al., 1998) or were larger for dependents than for 
the head of the household (Yoshida and Takagi, 2002). None of these, however, 
examined if the change in the co-payment rate affected physicians’ behavior as 
information on physician treatment was apparently unavailable. On the other hand, as 
the data set used in this paper was collected at hospitals, we are able to examine this 
possibility. 
The possibility that physicians may change treatment according to their own 
pecuniary incentives has been referred to as physician-induced demand (PID). Fuchs 
(1996) indicates that “fee-for-service” reimbursement schemes encouraged physicians 
to induce demands. The notion of PID was introduced by Evans (1974) and was 
developed in theory by Reinhardt (1985), Farley (1986), and McGuire and Pauly (1991), 
to name a few. The models in these studies are characterized by the incorporation of 
physician norms in physicians’ utility function to restrain pecuniary incentives. 
Empirical studies in this context include, for example, Gruber and Owings (1996), Yip 
(1998), Scott and Shiell (1997), and Giuffrida and Gravelle (2001). Yip (1998), using 
US data, concluded that physicians whose incomes were reduced the most by Medicare 
fee cuts performed higher volumes of coronary artery bypass graft surgeries; Scott and 
Shiell (1997), using Australian data, found that GPs who used content-based descriptors 
were just as likely to prescribe, counsel, and treat compared to GPs who used time-
based descriptors; and Giuffrida and Gravelle (2001), using UK data, found that the 
introduction of differential fees for GP and deputy visits in April 1990 led GPs to 
increase their own visits and reduce the number made by deputies. 
In the context of PID, patients have no way of influencing a physician’s decision. 
As argued in Section 1, patients have some bargaining power with physicians, partly 
because they can independently decide the number of visits and partly because they can 
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change physicians if they wish. Because health service providers in Japan face a 
situation where there is competition among medical institutions and no gatekeeper 
monitoring entry to medical institutions, it is not so easy for physicians to induce 
demand. Asymmetric information between a physician and a patient does not appear to 
matter as much in this situation, as theoretically suggested by Emons (1997, 2001). 
A few studies have attempted to study both physicians’ pecuniary incentives and 
patients’ moral hazard in the context of optimal insurance contracts. Zeckhauser (1970) 
is a pioneer, and Ma and McGuire (1997) generalize Zeckhauser’s model. In their 
models, a physician decides the “effort” in advance and then a patient chooses the 
quantity of treatment given the “effort”. McGuire (2000) focuses on physician-agency, 
where physicians decide the quantity of treatment to maximize their payoff subject to 
the constraint that the net benefit of a patient should be no less than the reservation 
benefit. Although physicians compete, patients will not change their physician as long 
as their net benefit is greater than the reservation benefit. 
Our study follows this line of research such that a patient and a physician interact 
with one another as independent players in health systems characterized by fees-for-
service, unrestricted access to providers (no-gatekeeper systems), and publicly 
predetermined fees-per-item. We model the behavior as a two-stage game where a 
physician decides the quantity of treatment in the first stage and a patient decides the 
number of visits in the second stage. This features both physicians’ and patients’ 
behavior under the elderly health care systems. 
 
3. Interaction between Physicians and Patients 
In this section, we present our model, which describes patients’ and physicians’ 
behavior and then predicts how they change their behavior when a proportional co-
payment scheme is introduced in place of a fixed co-payment. A physician is assumed to 
maximize his or her payoff, defined as the difference between the reimbursement rate of 
the medical fee and the actual cost of providing the medical service, by way of changing 
the quantity of medical services provided. A patient maximizes utility by deciding the 
number of visits given the provided medical services. 
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 3.1. Patients’ behavior 
The patient maximizes the following utility function, 
( ) ( )1 2, , ln ln , ,U c n c h n U Uα α ′≡ + + ≥x θ x    (1) 
where c is the composite consumption goods, h is the patient’s initial health stock, x is a 
quantity vector of medical services per visit, n is the number of visits in a given period 
(a month in this case), and θ is a vector of the marginal effects of the treatments on 
patient health. Utility should be no less than the reservation utility, U . 
We assume the patient knows θ, which means that she knows the contribution of 
the medical services to her health and thus there is no asymmetric information between 
a patient and a physician associated with medical services. Although asymmetric 
information is an important issue in health economics, we believe it does not matter as 
much with elderly outpatients. Because diseases of the elderly are in most cases chronic, 
patients know well their diseases and the contribution of the medical services to their 
health condition. Ma and McGuire (1997) and McGuire (2000) also assume this 
symmetry in information between a physician and the patient. 
The patient decides how often she visits a physician each month, n, given the 
quantity of medical services, x, under her budget constraints, Eq. (2) for the fixed co-
payment or Eq. (3) for the proportional co-payment scheme: 
,c fn y tn+ = −        (2) 
c p n y tn′+ = −φ x        (3) 
In the budget constraints, φ is a vector of the reimbursed medical fee per unit of medical 
service, f is the fixed co-payment per visit, which is irrelevant to x, p is the co-payment 
rate, and t is the opportunity cost per visit. Note that the price of the composite 
consumption good is normalized to one. Then p ′φ x  is the co-payment a patient should 
have to pay out-of-pocket, which depends on the quantity of medical service x. We can 
then obtain the optimal number of visits in both the fixed and the proportional co-
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payment schemes1: 
( )1 yn
f t
δ δ= − − h′+ θ x ,      (4) 
( )1 yn
p t
δ= − −′ +φ x θ x
hδ ′ ,       (5) 
where 1 1 2/( )δ α α α= + . 
From Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we can see that the number of visits is determined by two 
factors in both cases: one is the co-payment plus the opportunity cost of a visit as a 
proportion of income, namely, the cost of a visit. This is represented by the first term on 
the right-hand side of Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). The other is the proportion of improvement of 
health provided by medical services to the health stock, which is represented by the 
second term. The larger the cost of a visit to income or the smaller the improvement of 
health to health stock, the fewer times a patient visits the physician. 
We now consider how the patient’s visits change when the cost-share scheme is 
reformed from fixed co-payment to proportional co-payment. If a physician does not 
change the treatments following the reform, the number of visits depends only upon the 
cost of a visit. The number of visits increases if p t f t′ + < +φ x  after the reform and 
vice versa. Therefore, there are two groups of patients whom the reform adversely 
affects: one group is encouraged because of the lowered cost of visits and the other is 
discouraged. In general, a patient with a relatively severe chronic disease, such as 
diabetes, suffers because of an increase in co-payment, while one with less severe 
diseases, such as joint trouble, enjoys a decrease. 
 
3.2. Physicians’ behavior 
Because physicians know the health and economic conditions of their patients and 
thus the demand functions described by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), they can exploit this to 
                                                  
1 In fact, there is an upper limit for the total co-payment per month under both the fixed and the proportional co-
payment schemes. In the case of a fixed co-payment scheme, the patient should pay co-payment for no more than 
four visits and pay no co-payment for the fifth visit and thereafter. Thus the budget constraint is different for these 
cases, but we neglect this for the sake of simplicity in the model. It is not difficult but trivial to consider two cases, a 
case below the limit and the case of the limit. In our study, there are usually no more than four visits per month. 
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maximize their payoffs. The physician evaluates in advance how often a patient visits if 
given a certain amount of medical services, x, and then maximizes the payoff with 
respect to x. 
A physician’s payoff is defined as the difference between the reimbursement of the 
medical fee calculated item by item with the fee schedule and the actual cost of the 
provided medical services. Defining γ  as a vector of actual unit costs of the services, 
then the payoff per patient’s visit given the service quantity x is ′ ′−φ x γ x . The unit cost 
includes not only the cost of the medicines, but also the unit labor cost for co-medical 
staff and any other variable costs. McGuire (2000, p. 475) uses the same objective 
function for the profit-maximization behavior of physicians2. 
The physician maximizes the payoff subject to the insurer-imposed constraints on 
the quantities and combinations of medical services. To prevent fraud claims from 
physicians under a fee-for-service reimbursement scheme, the insurer often investigates 
the claims on which the items and the quantities of medical services provided by a 
physician are described. The insurer checks if the combination of items is invalid or if 
the quantities are excessive. The physician’s problem is then 
           (6) 
where the constraint represents the permissible combination of the medical services. We 
assume that the set of feasible combinations of the services { }: ( )R M≤x x  is convex. 
With this constraint, the insurer can control the medical fee per visit below the maxima, 
namely the maximized value of subject to ( )R M′ ≤φ . x x
Since the physician knows the patient’s demand function, the payoff functions for 
the fixed and proportional co-payment schemes are: 
( ) ( )1f y h
f t
δ δ⎡ ⎤ ′Π = − − −⎢ ⎥′+⎣ ⎦ φ γ xθ x ,    (7) 
and 
                                                  
x
. .
n n
s t R M
′ ′−
≤
x
φ x γ x
x
{ }
ma :∏ =
( )
2 In Section 4, we empirically examine the validity of the model with microdata from two hospitals. Since there is no 
categorization of doctor fees in the fee schedule, a physician cannot identify which part of the profit reimbursed from 
the insurance association should be attributed to her. We assume that the physician behaves so as to maximize the 
profits of the hospital worked for as if she owns the hospital. 
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           (8) ( ) ( )1p y h
p t
δ δ⎡ ⎤ ′∏ =
We classify the medical services into two types, type-1 denoted by x1 and type-2 
denoted by x2. Type-1 services are laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging, which 
will not directly improve the patient’s health condition. Typical type-2 health services 
include medicine prescriptions, surgical operations, and consultations, which will 
directly ease physical or psychological damage. 
− − −⎢ ⎥′ ′+⎣ ⎦ φ γ xφ x θ x
These two types of medical services have different effects on patients’ visits 
following two assumptions. First, we assume that type-2 services improve patients’ 
health conditions, but type-1 services do not, that is 1 0θ = , for simplicity. Of course, 
type-1 services may be necessary for determining proper treatment and thus will 
indirectly contribute to a patient’s health condition. This also implies, however, that a 
patient does not become healthier if only laboratory tests or diagnostic imaging are 
conducted. In fact, the contribution of type-1 services to health, particularly in chronic 
diseases, is relatively small when compared to that of type-2 services. Second, we 
assume the profit margin rates with respect to x1 and x2, namely the profit margin 
defined as = −η φ γ  divided by the unit fees in x1 and x2, are the same, that is 1 2
1 2
η η
γ γ= , 
or equivalently, 1
1 2
2η η
ϕ ϕ= . This is often the case in the fee schedule because the unit fee 
is determined as (1 + margin rate) * unit cost as based on surveillance of the market 
prices of medicines or wages of co-medical staff. With these two assumptions, 
increasing type-1 services does not improve the health condition of a patient nor 
increase visits, but does contribute to the physician’s payoff as much as type-2 services. 
A physician has to consider how to change type-1 or type-2 services when the co-
payment scheme is reformed from the fixed to the proportional co-payment scheme. We 
first clarify the conditions for the optimal combinations of the services in both the fixed 
and the proportional co-payment schemes and then consider how a physician will 
change the two types of medical services after the reform. 
In the equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution should equal the tangent of the 
constraint condition the insurer imposes, namely, 2x x1R R , where 1xR or 2xR  are partial 
derivatives of ( )R x  with respect to 1x  or 2x . In the fixed co-payment scheme, we can 
 
11
obtain the marginal rate as 
(1 2 1 1 2 22
2 1 2 2
1
1 1
f
f
const
dx h )x x
dx x
x
η δ η ηη θΠ =
− = + ⋅ +∂Π ∂
,   (9) 
where 
( )
1
1 2
1f y h
x f t x
δ δ
2
ηθ
−⎡∂∏ = −⎢∂ +⎣ ⎦
⎤⎥ .      (10) 
Details are discussed in Appendix A. In the same way, we can also derive the marginal 
rate of substitution in the proportional co-payment scheme as 
( )1 2 1 1 2 22
2 1 2 2
1
1 1
p
p
const
dx h x x
dx x
x
η δ η ηη θΠ =
− = + ⋅ +∂Π ∂
   (11) 
where 
( )
( ) 121 2
1p yt h
x xp t
δ δ
2
ηθ
⎡ ⎤−∂∏ = −⎢∂ ′ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦φ x
⎥ .      (12) 
The optimal combination of the two services is determined by equating the rate of 
substitution, Eq. (9) or Eq. (11), to the tangent of the constraint. 
Let us see how a physician will change the quantities of medical services after the 
reform starting with the equilibrium under the fixed co-payment scheme. Comparing the 
marginal substitution rate of the fixed co-payment, Eq. (9), with the proportional co-
payment, Eq. (11), we find that the two equations are the same except for the marginal 
payoffs with respect to x1 in the second terms. The marginal payoffs of the two co-
payment schemes defined as Eq. (10) for the fixed and as Eq. (12) for the proportional, 
are different for the first terms in the brackets. If the co-payment per visit in the 
proportional co-payment, namely p ′φ x , is somewhat smaller than that in the fixed co-
payment, f, or more precisely speaking, if ( )2 (p t t f′ )t+ < +φ x  holds, the marginal 
payoff of the proportional co-payment is larger than the fixed co-payment and vice 
versa. Note that the condition ( )2 (p t t f′ )t+ < +φ x  means the patient’s disease is light 
since the number of per-visit medical services, ′φ x , is small. Then, under the condition 
where the co-payment of a patient in the case of the proportional co-payment is small, 
the absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution of the proportional co-payment 
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scheme is smaller at the equilibrium point in the fixed co-payment scheme. We can 
conclude that a physician will increase x1 while decreasing x2 to maximize the payoff 
when the co-payment scheme changes from fixed to proportional. This is because the 
marginal payoff with respect to x1 in the proportional co-payment scheme is larger than 
the fixed co-payment. Increasing x1 along the insurer-imposed constraint, ( )R M≤x , is 
then profitable for the physician. On the other hand, if the co-payment per visit is large, 
or more precisely speaking, if ( )2 (p t t f′ )t+ > +φ x  holds, a physician will increase x2 
while decreasing x1 along the constraint 3. 
Figure 1 illustrates this reasoning. We will explain the above results intuitively with 
the figure. The equilibrium is Ef under the fixed co-payment scheme and we will start 
from here, where ( ) . After the proportional co-payment is introduced, 
a physician will change the combination of x
2 (p t t f′ + < +φ x )t
1 and x2 to maximize the payoff. The 
physician cannot, however, change the combination arbitrarily because of the 
constraints imposed by the insurer, so will consider first how to change x1 and x2 while 
keeping the payoff level at Ef under the constraint, which implies changing x1 and x2 
along the tangent line of  at EpΠ f. Since the line is gentler than the tangent line of fΠ , 
the increase in x2 and decrease in x1 along the line of pΠ  results in moving outside the 
constraint. Thus the physician has to increase x1 while decreasing x2 and finds the better 
combination of x1 and x2 at Ep where the marginal rate of substitution is the same as the 
tangent of the constraint. 
In general, two medical services, x1 and x2, have different paths that affect a 
physician’s payoff. The latter has direct effects by expanding the cost-reimbursement 
margin and indirect effects by increasing patient visits through enhancing utility. The 
former has only direct effects since we assume that type-1 medical services, such as 
laboratory tests or diagnostic imaging, make no direct contribution to patient health. We 
cannot increase x1 and x2 at the same time because of the constraint imposed by the 
insurer. Thus, physicians will consider which is better for their own payoff: increasing 
x1 (and decreasing x2) or decreasing x1 (and increasing x2). It then depends on whether 
the marginal payoff with respect to x1 or x2 is larger. The physician will expand the cost-
                                                  
3 These results depend on the fact that both fΠ  and pΠ  are concave functions.  
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reimbursement margin by increasing x1 rather than luring patient visits by increasing x2 
because the marginal payoff by increasing x1 is larger. This also implies that x2 is 
excessive at Ef after the proportional co-payment scheme has been introduced. In other 
words, a physician provides more medical services of form x2 in the fixed co-payment 
scheme than in the proportional co-payment scheme if the disease is less severe, 
because under fixed co-payment the physician has to be concerned only with luring 
patient visits, but not with the cost of the visit. 
In the case of ( ) , where the disease is more severe, the reverse 
holds; that is, inducing visits by increasing x
2 (p t t f′ + > +φ x )t
2 is more profitable, even after taking into 
account the reduction of margin obtained by decreasing x1. 
The total medical fee, m ′≡ φ x , at Ep can be proved to be higher than that at Ef 
when ( ) ; otherwise it is lower. Since the slope of the line, m2 (p t t f′ + < +φ x )t ′= φ x , 
is the same as the first terms of the marginal substitution rates, Eq. (9) and Eq. (11), 
because of the assumption 2
1 1
2ϕ η
ϕ η= , the slope is gentler than the marginal rates of 
substitution of the fixed and proportional co-payment schemes at Ep or Ef. The total 
medical fees of these two equilibriums are expressed as the intercepts of the lines 
running on Ep or Ef. Since Ep is located above the line of the medical fee that runs on Ef 
when ( ) , the intercept of the line running on E2 (p t t f′ + < +φ x )t p is higher than the 
line running on Ef and vice versa. 
In summary, we can provide the following predictions when a proportional co-
payment scheme is introduced in place of fixed co-payment. A patient’s total medical 
fee become larger when his/her total cost of doctor visits, including the copayment and 
the opportunity cost, would be less under the proportional co-payment scheme and if the 
physician provided the same treatment. Then the number of type-1 medical services 
increases and the number of type-2 services decreases. On the other hand, the total 
medical fee becomes smaller when the total cost of doctor visits would be more under 
the proportional co-payment scheme.  
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4. Empirical Studies 
We use health insurance claims data from two hospitals, one located in Tokyo 
(Hospital A) and the other in Osaka (Hospital B)4. These hospitals have a similar 
number of beds (about 400), and nearly the same kinds of specialties, including internal 
medicine, surgery, and ophthalmology. Outpatient claims by patients who were more 
than 70 years old and who visited hospital at least once during both the pre- and 
postreform periods were collected for the 12 months before the reform, and for six 
months after the reform5. Note that claims by patients are sent from the physician (or 
the hospital) to the insurer once a month so that the total number of claims would be 
twelve if a patient visits at least once every month of the year. 
In the claim data, the following information is reported: the monthly number of 
doctor visits; total medical fee decomposed into 10 categorized medical services and the 
co-payment; diagnoses; and the kinds of medicines and their units. The total fee is 
calculated based on the fee schedule, where medical services are disaggregated into 
many items down to the finest detail and some points are attributed to a unit of each 
item, where one point is valued at 10 yen. The fee categories for medical services are 
base, consultation, doctor-visit, medication, injection, physical therapy, operation, 
laboratory test, diagnostic imaging, and others. Thus, we can see which categories a 
physician increases or decreases following the reform. 
We classify patients into two groups, one where the co-payment rate rose after the 
reform (patient-1) and the other where it fell (patient-2). This classification corresponds 
to the grouping of patients theoretically discussed in the previous section. The patients 
are classified according to whether or not ( )2 (p t t f′ )t+ < +φ x  holds, which is nearly 
the same as the condition p f ′< φ x ; that is, the postreform co-payment rate is smaller 
than the actual co-payment rate under the fixed co-payment scheme. Although the co-
payment rate is, in principle, 10 percent following the reform, the rates of a small 
portion of patients are less than 10 percent because they are subsidized by the 
                                                  
4 These two hospitals are prestigious hospitals that provide both outpatient and inpatient services or both primary and 
high-level medical care services.  
5 The difference in the data-gathering periods before and after the reforms may cause bias in the number of visits 
since patients rarely visiting a physician are likely to drop from the data set. The elderly with chronic diseases, 
however, often visit a physician so that not as many patients are removed.  
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government for some other reason. Thus, the co-payment rates are calculated by 
dividing the total co-payment by the total medical fee aggregated in each surveillance 
period, 12 months for the prereform period and six months for the postreform period. 
Even after this calculation, most co-payment rates are 10 percent in the postreform 
period. 
Our strategy to test whether physicians changed medical services in quantity or 
category for the patient-1 and patient-2 groups is as follows. First, we test whether the 
quantities of medical services changed after the reform. If this is the case, we then test 
which category or categories of medical services changed. These tests are referred to as 
tests of between-period differences. We expect that physicians provide more services 
for patient-2 and less for patient-1. These tests, however, do not examine if the direction 
of the changes between the two groups is significantly different. Accordingly, we test 
for whether the direction of change is significantly different by comparing the changes 
of the two groups between the pre- and postreform periods, which are referred to as 
tests of between-group differences. We take differences in the medical fees between 
the two periods for the patient-1 and patient-2 groups, and then compare the distribution 
of the between-period fee-differences between the groups. Finally, we test if we can 
capture the changes of the quantities associated with the reform or if the grouping of 
samples into patient-1 and patient-2 is valid. We are concerned that, if the tests capture 
only the periodical changes of medical services, that is, when the quantities of the 
medical services to a patient are smaller than in previous periods, then they are likely to 
become larger for the same patient in the next period. This may happen, for example, 
when laboratory tests are conducted periodically, say, once every year. Alternatively, 
Galton’s regression fallacy may apply. We will therefore check that changes in the 
quantities of medical services are not caused by possible periodical changes or by 
Galton’s regression fallacy.  
 
4.1. Between-period differences 
Table 1 shows the means and the standard deviations of the basic statistics relevant 
to physician and patient behavior. The number of patients in the patient-1 category in 
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Hospital A is 3621 (84%) and the patient-2 category is 690 (16%), while in Hospital B 
the patient-1 number is 932 (43%) and the patient-2 number is 2179 (57%). The co-
payment rates rise from 4.66% to 9.51% in Hospital A and from 6.61% to 9.69% in 
Hospital B in patient-1, while they fall from 16.36% to 9.65% and from 21.17% to 
10.46% in patient-2, respectively6. 
Let us examine the data of Hospital A. The expected visits per month and the 
expected fee per month are calculated by dividing the total visits or the total medical fee, 
respectively, for the months of the surveillance period by the number of months. Note 
again that in the fee schedule, some points are attributed to one unit of the medical 
service disaggregated item by item and one point is valued at 10 yen. 
The most important fact derived from the table is that physicians seem to change 
the average quantity of medical services provided to patients after the reform. Patient-
2’s points per visit and expected fee per month increased from 368 to 622 and from 
4293 yen to 7351 yen, respectively. The co-payment, however, changes very little, 
increasing from 506 to 535 yen. If a physician gives the same treatment to patient-2 as 
in the prereform period, the co-payment would decrease because the co-payment rate 
fell after the reform. The t-values to test the hypothesis of whether the prereform and 
postreform means of the variables are the same are also shown in the table. We find 
from the table that the t-values of points per visits and the expected fee per month are 
both positive and significant, while that of co-payment per visit is not significant at the 
10% significance level. This implies that physicians changed the quantity of medical 
services, but tried to keep the co-payment constant in order to prevent patients from 
decreasing their number of visits. The number of visits per month by patient-2 increased 
from 1.23 to 1.29, which is not significant. On the other hand, patient-1’s points per 
visit and expected fee per month did not change as much (decreasing from 1335 to 1306 
points and from 19,426 yen to 19,716 yen, respectively), and their insignificant t-values 
imply that physicians did not change their medical services. The number of visits per 
month did not change either, although patient-1’s co-payment per visit increased 
significantly from 458 yen to 1134 yen. From these facts, we find that the effects of the 
                                                  
6 In general, the medical fees in Hospital A are higher than in Hospital B. This is because medical practice and 
medicine dispensation are not separated in Hospital A but are separated in Hospital B. The medical fees of a claim are 
then larger on average in Hospital A because they include the cost of prescribed medicine. 
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introduction of the proportional co-payment scheme are not symmetric for patient-1 and 
patient-2 of Hospital A. We discuss this point in the last paragraph of Section 5. 
In Hospital B, however, the effects are symmetric, as we anticipated in the model 
presented in the previous section. The points per visit and expected fee per month for 
patient-1 significantly decreased from 1054 to 710 points and from 5380 yen to 3793 
yen, respectively, while the points per visit and the fee for patient-2 significantly 
increased from 304 to 442 points and from 1898 yen to 2820 yen, respectively. The 
expected visits per month of patient-1 decreased from 0.69 to 0.65, while the visits of 
patient-2 increased from 0.63 to 0.68; both changes are insignificant. The co-payment 
per visit of patient-1 increased significantly from 497 yen to 590 yen, while that of 
patient-2 significantly decreased from 520 yen to 390 yen. This implies that physicians 
in Hospital B provide fewer medical services to patient-1 after the reform and more to 
patient-27. 
A question then arises: how do physicians control the total medical fee? The answer 
is in Table 2: physicians change the quantities of medical services mainly with 
laboratory tests, in diagnostic imaging, or in medication, particularly for Hospital A. In 
general, there are two ways to change the services: one is to change the intensity of the 
service, and the other is to change the number of patients to whom the specific medical 
services are provided. We show two test statistics, one to test whether the pre- and 
postreform means of the variables are the same8, while the other is to test whether the 
pre- and postreform ratios of patients to whom the specific medical services are 
provided to the population (nonzero ratio) are the same. 
In Hospital A, the main sources of medical fees are medication, laboratory tests, 
and diagnostic imaging. For patient-1, physicians significantly decreased average 
laboratory tests from 228 to 191. The changes in the mean medication or diagnostic 
imaging are insignificant. The nonzero ratios of these three categories decreased 
significantly, which implies physicians in Hospital A provided these medical services to 
fewer patients after the reform. At the same time, as indicated by the zero-excluded t-
                                                  
7 We also calculated the asymptotic t-values of the hypothesis that the means of the two groups are the same when the 
population variances are different. The values are almost the same as those in Table 1. 
8 Note that the zero samples of each category, that is, patients to whom no service of the category is provided, are 
included when calculating the means in the table.   
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values, medication and diagnostic imaging fees increased significantly but laboratory 
tests decreased. With these facts in mind, we can argue that the typical physician in 
Hospital A provides medication, laboratory tests, or diagnostic imaging to fewer 
patients after the reform, while increasing the intensity of medication and laboratory 
tests. On the other hand, physicians significantly increased the average fees for patient-2 
in these three categories, from 160 to 197 in medication, from 80 to 141 in laboratory 
tests, and from 24 to 118 in diagnostic imaging. The changes of nonzero ratios are 
insignificant. As for the nonzero samples, the intensities of the three categories 
significantly increased. This implies that physicians increased the intensity of these 
services only to those patients who received the same kind of services before. 
In Hospital B, the main sources of medical fees are laboratory tests and diagnostic 
imaging. They significantly decreased for patient-1, while they significantly increased 
for patient-2. The zero ratios decreased significantly in both categories for patient-1 and 
in laboratory tests for patient-2. The ratio in diagnostic imaging of patient-2 decreased 
but not significantly. The intensities of the nonzero samples increased in the categories 
for both patient-1 and patient-2. These imply that the typical physician in Hospital B 
decreased the medical fees for patient-1 by providing laboratory tests or diagnostic 
imaging to fewer patients or by decreasing intensity, while increasing intensity for 
patient-2. 
Figures 2 and 3 depict the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of laboratory 
test fees of patient-1 and the patient-2 in the prereform and postreform periods of 
Hospitals A and B. The CDF of patient-1 shifts upward after the reform, which implies 
that laboratory test fees became smaller, while that of patient-2 shifts downward, which 
implies that laboratory test fees became larger. 
Note that base fee’s share to the total fee is not small and it also increased in the 
patient-1 and decreased in the patient-2 significantly both in Hospital A and in Hospital 
B. Although the reason for these significant changes is not clear9, the amount of the 
                                                  
9 There are two types of base fee: a fee for the initial visit and a fee for recurring visits. When patients visit a 
physician for an illness for the first time, they pay the former fee; when they visit again for the same illness, they pay 
the latter fee as the base fee. The initial-visit fee is nearly three times the repeat-visit fee. The point is that the 
physician decides whether a patient’s visit is for the same illness as the previous visit or for a new illness. Changes in 
the base fee in both Hospital A and Hospital B may reflect manipulation of this decision.  
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changes is not large compared with the changes of other sources of medical fee so that it 
does not contribute much to the change in the total medical fee. 
In summary, physicians in Hospital A and Hospital B behave as the model 
anticipated except for the case of patient-1 in Hospital A, in particular for medication. 
 
4.2. Between-group differences 
Although we find that the means of points per visit, expected fee per month, and 
provisions of some medical services changed significantly and adversely after the 
reform in both groups, patient-1 and patient-2, we also have to test if the opposite 
direction of change is statistically significant between the two groups. We take the 
differences in medical fees between the two periods of the patients belonging to the 
patient-1 group or to the patient-2 group, and then compare the distributions of the 
between-period fee-differences between the groups. If the directions of the two groups 
are significantly different, the CDF of the between-period fee-differences of patient-1 
should be located on the left-hand side of that of patient-2; that is, the percentile points 
of the distribution of patient-1 are lower than those of patient-2. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the distribution in four important fee-
related variables, points per visit, expected fee per month, and medical services, namely, 
medication and laboratory tests for Hospital A and laboratory tests and diagnostic 
imaging for Hospital B, and also shows the t statistics for the means and the confidence 
intervals of the medians to examine whether they differ between the patient-1 and 
patient-2 groups. We find that the mean and the percentile points, namely, 10%, 25%, 
median, 75%, and 90% points, of the between-period differences of patient-1 are 
smaller than those of patient-2, in both Hospital A and Hospital B, which implies that 
the CDF of patient-1 is located on the left-hand side of that of patient-2. These results 
reinforce the findings in Tables 1 and 2; that is, points per visit and medical services 
decreased in the patient-1 category but increased in the patient-2 category. This was 
associated with the changes of laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging. Note that the 
distribution of medication does not differ much so we cannot say whether medication is 
used to control the medical fees in Hospital A. 
 
20
The t statistics, testing if the means of the two distributions are different, show that 
the differences of the means in the four variables are statistically significant. We also 
make 99% confidence intervals of the differences between the medians of the patient-1 
and the patient-2 category using bootstrapping. Both the upper and lower bounds are 
positive except for the lower bound of the medication in Hospital A, which implies that 
the median of the distribution of patient-2 is larger than that of patient-1. This implies 
that physicians changed the quantities of medical services differently for patient-1 and 
patient-2 after the reform by controlling laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging. 
 
4.3. Validity of the grouping 
The results from Tables 1–3 may be criticized from a statistical viewpoint. We 
consider that patient-2 is characterized as a patient with a less serious disease and thus 
points per visit are relatively low, while patient-1 is diagnosed with a more serious 
disease and thus the points per visit are relatively high. This categorization may be 
criticized as follows. Even if there are differences in the severity of the diseases 
between patient-1 and patient-2, both patient groups need periodical laboratory tests or 
diagnostic imaging, for example once or twice a year. The patient with fewer points per 
visit before the reform does not need laboratory tests in that period and thus needs the 
tests in the next period, and vice versa. This is why the points per visit of patient-2 
increased after the reform while those of patient-1 decreased. 
More generally, if the pre- and postreform points per visit are positively correlated, 
it is well known that the regression coefficient of postreform points on prereform points 
should be less than one when they follow a normal distribution. The positive correlation 
is likely because most patients in this data set have a chronic disease, so the medical 
services provided to them do not change substantially. We may then fall into Galton’s 
regression fallacy. The regression slope of the expectation of the difference between the 
pre- and postreform points per visit is negative on the prereform points per visit and the 
intercept is positive as long as the two distributions of the points per visit have nearly 
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the same means and variances10 . Thus, the points per visit of patients with lower 
medical fees increase after the reform, while those of patients with higher medical fees 
decrease. In general, the points per visit of patient-2 are lower than those of patient-1 so 
that we may misconstrue these effects as a physician’s reaction against the reform. 
To respond to this criticism, we compare the distribution of the between-period fee-
differences of patient-1 and patient-2 based on the same fee bands in Table 4. In panel A 
of the table, we examine whether the distributions of patient-1 and patient-2 in the 
domain of fewer points per visit (from 100 to 1000 points) are the same, while in panel 
B we examine the distribution in the domain of more points per visit (over 1000 points). 
We employ five fee bands for panel A based on 20 percent interval percentiles of the 
prereform points per visit of the total number of patients (including both patient-1 and 
patient-2) who have between 100 and 1000 points per visit from both Hospital A and 
Hospital B, and for panel B based on the same percentiles of the total number of 
patients who have more than 1000 points per visit. In panel B, we compare the between-
period fee-differences of patient-1 with the fee-differences between the first six months 
and the second six months of the prereform period of the total number of patients who 
had more than 1000 points in the first six months of the prereform period. This is 
because there are fewer patients in the patient-2 group who have more than 1000 points 
per visit. 
We find in panel A that the between-period fee-differences of patient-2 are larger 
than those of patient-1 in every fee band in both Hospital A and Hospital B. This implies 
that the possible criticism is not valid because there would be no statistical difference 
between the distributions if it were valid. In the domain with more points per visit, that 
is, in Panel B, the absolute values of the means of fee-differences in patient-1 are larger 
than those of the prereform between-period fee-differences in every fee band in 
Hospital B. This implies that points for patient-1 patients decrease more than points for 
patients with the same number of points per visits in the first six month before the 
reform. In other words, fewer medical services are provided to patient-1 than to patients 
                                                  
10 The expectation of the difference is expressed as [ ]| 1yy x
x x
yE y x x m m x
ρσ ρσ
σ σ
⎛− = − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎞ , where x and y are the pre-
and post-reform points per visit, mx, my, σx and σy are their means and standard deviations, and ρ is the correlation 
coefficient. 
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with the same number of points per visit before the reform. These results answer any 
criticism and reinforce our argument that physicians will change their behavior in 
response to co-payment reform. 
The exception is, however, patient-1 in the domain with more points per visit in 
Hospital A. The absolute values of the means of fee-differences in patient-1 are smaller 
in every fee band, which implies that physicians did not decrease the medical services 
as much as for ordinary patients with the same number of points per visit. This result 
corresponds to the findings in Tables 1 and 3. The important point, however, is that the 
distributions of the between-period fee-differences of patient-1 are different from the 
prereform between-period fee-differences, which implies that decreases in the number 
of points per visit are not caused by Galton’s regression fallacy or by periodically 
conducted laboratory tests. Physicians in Hospital A appear to try to keep the fee per 
visit nearly the same as before the reform for patients with more points per visit. This is 
possible if the demand for the services provided by the Hospital A is inelastic. 
In summary, we conclude that the between-period fee-differences of patient-1 and 
patient-2 are not caused by ordinary changes, as Galton’s regression fallacy predicts, or 
the periodical changes of treatments, but are caused by changes in physician behavior. 
 
4.4. Tests according to disease 
The data set we used contains information about the each patient’s diseases. This 
allows us to examine whether the results above hold true for four representative diseases 
in the elderly, namely, cataract and related diagnoses, gastric ulcer and the related 
diagnoses, hypertension, and diabetes mellitus. We pick up patients who have claims on 
which at least one of these diagnoses is listed. Note that, as elderly patients could have 
two or more of the diagnoses listed above, there is some overlap of patients in the 
diagnosis data sets, but the number is not large. 
Table 5 summarizes the statistics listed in Tables 1 and 2 of points per visit, 
expected fee per month, medication, laboratory tests, and diagnostic imaging. Almost 
the same findings discussed earlier hold for these four diagnoses: postreform, points per 
visit increase for patient-2 associated with the increase of laboratory tests in Hospital A, 
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while the points per visit increase (decrease) for patient-2 (patient-1) associated with the 
increase (decrease) of laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging in Hospital B. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate how physicians change the quantity of medical 
services to patients in response to reform of the co-payment scheme for the elderly from 
a fixed to a proportional co-payment system. We propose a physician–patient interaction 
model where the physician decides the quantity of medical services first and then the 
patient decides the number of visits. We also examine empirically whether physicians 
change the quantities of medical services associated with the co-payment scheme, and if 
so, in which kind of services. We find that physicians provide more services to patients 
whose co-payment would decrease if the services were the same as before the reform 
and fewer services to patients whose co-payment would increase, by changing the 
quantities of laboratory tests and/or diagnostic imaging. 
This paper’s contributions are twofold: one is to formulate a model incorporating 
the interaction between physicians and elderly patients based on the Japanese health 
care system, and the other is to empirically examine the validity of the model by 
reviewing whether the changes in the quantity of medical services that physicians 
provide is the same as the model predicts. Many studies examine physician behavior 
from the viewpoint of demand inducement based on a fee-for-service reimbursement 
scheme or study patient behavior from a moral hazard viewpoint. Only a few discuss the 
physician–patient interaction, including Ma and McGuire (1997) and Lien et al. (2004), 
which empirically examines which type of interaction is most effective—rationing, 
effort or persuasion—based on the interaction mode. In our paper, the predicted results 
derived from our interaction model are supported by the data. 
A few questions arise, however, concerning the data. For example, why did 
Hospital A not change the quantity of medical services to patient-1, whose co-payment 
rate rose after the reform, while changing the quantity provided to patient-2, whose co-
payment rate fell after the reform? On the other hand, Hospital B decreased the quantity 
of services provided to patient-1, while increasing the quantity to patient-2. The two 
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hospitals have very similar attributes, that is, they have nearly the same number of beds, 
doctors and specialties so it is expected that they would also have similar behavior. The 
difference in behavior between the two hospitals may depend on the demand elasticity 
to the co-payment of patients. We assume elastic demand for medical services in our 
model. However, the demand may be inelastic in Hospital A because there may be 
excellent physicians in the hospital or there may be only a few competitors near the 
hospital. Accordingly, Hospital A does not need to decrease medical services to patient-
1 to prevent them from moving to a competitor. A future research project could consider 
how hospitals’ changes to the quantity of medical services correspond to the 
competitive environment. 
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Appendix A: 
In this appendix, we present details of how we obtain the marginal rates of 
substitution of the fixed co-payment and the proportional co-payment schemes in 
Section 2. In the case of the fixed co-payment, the marginal payoffs with respect to x1 
and x2 are   
( )
1
1 2
1f y h
x f t x
δ δ
2
ηθ
−⎡ ⎤∂∏ = −⎢ ⎥∂ +⎣ ⎦
, 
and 
( ) ( )2 1 12
2 2 2 2 2
1 1f y h h
2 2x xx f t x x
δ δ δη ηθ θ
−⎡ ⎤∂∏ = − + ⋅ +⎢ ⎥∂ +⎣ ⎦
η . 
Thus the marginal rate of substitution is 
( )1 22 1 1 2 22
2 1 2 2
1 1
1 1
f
f
f f
const
dx hx x x
dx x
x x
η δ η ηη θΠ =
∂Π ∂− = = + ⋅ +∂Π ∂Π∂ ∂
. 
In the case of the proportional co-payment, the marginal payoffs are 
( )
( ) ( )2 1 12 22 2 2 2 2
1 1P yt h h
2 2x xx x xp t
δ δ δη ηθ θ
⎡ ⎤−∂∏ = − + ⋅ +⎢ ⎥∂ ′ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦φ x
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. 
In the second equation, we used the assumption that the margin rates of the two 
medical services are the same, namely, 1
1 2
2η η
ϕ ϕ= . Then, the marginal rate of substitution 
is obtained as 
 ( )1 22 1 1 2 22
2 1 2 2
1 1
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P
P
P P
const
dx hx x x
dx x
x x
η δ η ηη θΠ =
∂Π ∂− = = + ⋅ +∂Π ∂Π∂ ∂
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Figure 1: Changes in quantities of medical services 
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Figure 2: CDFs of laboratory test fee in Hospital A in pre- and 
postreform periods 
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Note: The legends, pre-patient1, post-patient1, pre-patient2 and post-patient1 means laboratory fee 
of patient-1 in prereform period, that of patient-1 in postreform period, that of patient-2 in prereform 
period and that of patient 2 in postreform period, respectively. 
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Figure 3: CDFs of laboratory test fee in Hospital B in pre- and 
postreform periods 
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Note: The legends, pre-patient1, post-patient1, pre-patient2 and post-patient1 means laboratory fee 
of patient-1 in prereform period, that of patient-1 in postreform period, that of patient-2 in prereform 
period and that of patient 2 in postreform period, respectively.  
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Table 1:　Between-period Changes in Visits, Fees, Copayment and Copayment Rate
No. of
Sample
No. of
claims
No. of
claims
per
month
No. of
visits per
claim
Points
per visit
Copayment
per visit
Expected
visits per
month
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
copayment
rate（％）
Hospital A
pre 3621 8.56 0.71 2.18 1335 458 1.64 19,426 4.66
post 4.52 0.75 2.07 1306 1134 1.65 19,716 9.51
pre 3.90 0.32 1.61 1128 102 1.67 21,001 2.23
post 1.80 0.30 1.63 1233 737 1.68 21,979 1.45
t value 5.56 -2.97 -1.04 54.60 0.27 0.57
pre 690 7.68 0.64 1.76 368 506 1.23 4,293 16.36
post 4.00 0.67 1.82 622 535 1.29 7,351 9.65
pre 4.01 0.33 1.17 141 58 1.25 4,263 10.26
post 1.87 0.31 1.25 781 444 1.24 11,508 1.29
t value 1.53 0.93 8.40 1.73 0.95 6.55
Hospital B
pre 932 3.10 0.26 2.48 1054 497 0.69 5,380 6.61
post 1.84 0.31 1.98 710 590 0.65 3,793 9.69
pre 2.08 0.17 2.67 1249 88 1.04 8,016 2.48
post 0.98 0.16 1.96 1076 515 0.91 6,351 1.62
t value 6.11 -4.52 -6.37 5.46 -0.70 -4.74
pre 2179 4.16 0.35 1.83 303 520 0.63 1,898 21.17
post 2.21 0.37 1.83 442 390 0.68 2,820 9.71
pre 2.34 0.20 1.38 152 46 0.57 1,817 10.46
post 1.19 0.20 1.63 709 329 0.71 4,275 1.07
t value 3.66 0.14 8.98 -18.35 2.41 9.27
copayment rate fell                 (patient-2)
mean
s.d.
Note: The patient-1 denotes the patients whose copayment rates rose after the reform, while the patient-2 denotes patinets whose copayment
rates fell after the reform.
mean
s.d.
copayment rate rose                (patient-1)
copayment rate fell                 (patient-2)
copayment rate rose                (patient-1)
s.d.
mean
s.d.
mean
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Table 2: Between-period Changes in Medical Fee by Fee Categories
Base Consultation Doctor-visit Medication Injection Physicaltherapy
Operation Laboratory
test
Diagnostic
Imaging
Others
Hospital A
pre 74 29 98 648 86 6 18 228 136 10
post 72 30 107 664 88 5 10 191 128 11
pre 44 63 691 574 549 44 144 270 332 48
post 43 61 764 618 576 25 98 209 349 49
t value -2.45 0.53 0.55 1.20 0.12 -2.25 -2.64 -6.57 -1.05 0.25
t value (zeros excluded) -2.14 1.43 0.59 2.61 2.49 2.74 0.20 -2.68 4.93 2.44
pre 1.00 0.94 0.04 0.94 0.23 0.36 0.08 0.91 0.68 0.08
post 0.99 0.90 0.04 0.92 0.16 0.17 0.04 0.81 0.48 0.07
t value -2.49 -6.17 0.18 -4.30 -7.24 -18.13 -6.30 -11.76 -17.68 -1.77
pre 75 10 1 160 3 7 1 80 24 8
post 81 11 19 197 9 7 30 141 118 9
pre 45 29 10 120 16 28 11 99 70 37
post 55 30 325 226 93 31 243 197 492 42
t value 2.30 1.22 1.45 3.84 1.73 -0.20 3.13 7.21 4.98 0.22
t value (zeros excluded) 2.59 1.31 1.56 3.98 1.68 2.29 3.69 8.53 5.23 0.52
pre 0.99 0.76 0.00 0.86 0.06 0.29 0.02 0.72 0.34 0.08
post 0.98 0.75 0.01 0.87 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.70 0.35 0.08
t value -1.42 -0.31 1.27 0.48 0.85 -5.68 1.97 -0.83 0.34 -0.20
Hospital B
pre 117 20 173 3 26 4 124 319 209 60
post 94 21 163 2 17 2 19 211 118 64
pre 103 63 1020 19 101 18 776 279 403 44
post 76 74 1009 27 73 13 149 239 346 46
t value -5.60 0.16 -0.20 -0.57 -2.17 -3.17 -4.04 -8.98 -5.27 2.05
t value (zeros excluded) -2.49 -6.17 0.18 -4.30 -7.24 -18.13 -6.30 -11.76 -17.68 -1.77
pre 1.00 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.83 0.61 0.84
post 1.00 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.64 0.29 0.81
t value . -2.74 -0.45 -2.33 -4.86 -9.02 -4.84 -9.66 -14.70 -1.22
pre 73 8 0 1 7 1 4 110 24 75
post 81 13 6 2 9 5 40 146 67 73
pre 27 32 8 4 28 6 79 122 56 29
post 57 49 112 44 50 124 609 204 206 35
t value 6.16 3.75 2.14 1.93 2.27 1.33 2.78 6.92 9.42 -1.85
t value (zeros excluded) -2.49 -6.17 0.18 -4.30 -7.24 -18.13 -6.30 -11.76 -17.68 -1.77
pre 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.63 0.29 0.95
post 1.00 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.55 0.27 0.93
t value . 0.15 1.28 -0.54 -2.34 -5.29 0.87 -5.35 -1.11 -2.98
Note: The patient-1 denotes the patients whose copayment rates rose after the reform, while the patient-2 denotes patinets whose copayment rates fell after the
reform.
Nonzero
ratio
mean
s.d.
mean
s.d.
mean
s.d.
Nonzero
ratio
Nonzero
ratio
mean
s.d.
Nonzero
ratio
copayment rate rose                (patient-1)
copayment rate fell                 (patient-2)
copayment rate rose                (patient-1)
copayment rate fell                 (patient-2)
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Table 3:　Tests of Between-group Differences of Between-period Fee-differences
Hospital A Hospital B
Points per
visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Medication Laboratory
test
Points per
visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Laboratory
test
Diagnostic
Imaging
Mean -29 290 17 -37 -344 -1587 -108 -92
10% -592 -10328 -288 -234 -896 -6212 -466 -419
25% -232 -4269 -95 -95 -524 -2794 -266 -151
Median -10 -283 0 -8 -244 -903 -56 0
75% 182 4251 120 53 -8 790 12 0
90% 490 11349 332 166 278 3007 185 111
s.d. 734 13259 390 273 959 6175 310 397
Mean 254 3056 37 61 139 922 35 43
10% -83 -1910 -70 -71 -188 -1655 -155 -55
25% -13 -437 -15 -11 -59 -597 -50 0
Median 61 518 1 0 12 205 0 0
75% 253 3328 44 88 184 1518 89 0
90% 651 9211 145 243 459 3810 247 148
s.d. 725 9981 196 186 652 4042 199 206
9.37 6.30 2.09 11.63 14.07 11.41 13.02 9.82
 upper bound 101.3 1217.9 2.4 16.4 302.7 1351.7 90.5 19.0
 lower bound 48.6 450.8 -2.7 2.2 218.2 810.8 32.1 0.0
Note: The s.d. denotes the standard deviation. The t statistics are for testing if the means of the variables of the patient-1 and the patient-2 categories are the
same.
99% confidence interval of
the difference between the
medians of the patient-1and
the patient-2
t statistics
copayment rate rose                (patient-1)
copayment rate fell                 (patient-2)
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Table 4:　Validity Test of the Grouping
Hospital A Hospital B
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-2
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-1
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-2
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-1
Fee Band (points)
159 93 I  (100-180) 191 81
191 107 II (181-302) 148 43
1575 61 III(303-412) 126 -20
1098 34 IV(413-553) 11 -70
3031 51 V(554-1000) 1065 -179
233 59 134 -148
60 14 23 -187
685 346 542 366
6.32 15.42
Means of the
pre-reform
between-
period fee
differences
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-1
Means of the
pre-reform
between-
period fee
differences
Means of the
between-
period fee
differences in
Patient-1
Fee Band (points)
-35 48 I (1001-1109) -10 -386
-99 -11 II (1110-1298) -60 -411
-128 -83 III(1299-1614) -124 -571
-255 -108 IV(1615-2646) -288 -1090
-619 -403 V(2646-14550) -711 -2246
-235 -111 -235 -939
-171 -77 -171 -747
890 960 890 1682
-4.02 6.26
Note 1: We employ five fee bands for panel A based on 20 percent interval percentiles of the prereform points per visit of the total number of
patients (including both patient-1 and patient-2) who have between 100 and 1000 points per visit from both Hospital A and Hospital B, and for panel
B based on the same percentiles of the total number of patients who have more than 1000 points per visit.
Note 2: In panel B, we compare the between-period fee-differences of patient-1 with the fee-differences between the first six months and the second
six months of the prereform period of the total number of patients who had more than 1000 points in the first six months of the prereform period.
V (2272 - 12608)
I (1001 - 1145)
II (1146 - 1354)
III (1355 - 1644)
IV (1645 - 2271)
mean
median
s.d.
t value
Fee Band (points)
I  (100 - 407)
median
s.d.
t value
II (408 - 560)
III (561 - 694)
IV (695 - 834)
V (835 - 1000)
Panel A
Panel B
Lower Point-Per-
Visit Domain
(100-1000 points)
Higher Point-Per-
Visit Domain
(over-1000 points)
Fee Band (points)
mean
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Table 5: Tests According to Disease
Hospital A Hospital B
Points
per visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Medication Laboratory
test
Points
per visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Laboratory
test
Diagnostic
Imaging
917 204
pre 1060 20761 568 201 904 8218 374 144
post 1067 20036 591 191 606 6045 308 49
0.16 -0.73 0.99 -1.32 -4.85 -2.45 -3.23 -4.21
6.44 -724.73 22.50 -9.27 -297.75 -2173.33 -66.26 -95.54
1.02 -656.25 3.60 -2.73 -174.71 -1154.17 -39.33 -24.00
200 258
pre 822 21612 446 151 380 4072 197 22
post 942 20651 523 151 510 6098 231 45
3.73 3.36 2.11 4.08 4.51 3.72 2.77 2.69
245.07 3277.67 36.64 52.85 130.36 2025.79 33.75 23.34
53.62 335.00 1.43 21.55 31.33 300.00 9.27 9.27
3.72 4.59 0.77 5.01 7.33 5.21 5.48 5.58
1030 45
pre 1430 25086 759 220 1057 9740 320 292
post 1438 24336 789 189 864 9298 227 219
0.15 -0.73 1.06 -3.23 -0.78 -0.15 -1.46 -0.65
8.51 -749.93 30.83 -31.21 -193.53 -442.50 -93.32 -72.17
-8.99 -979.17 5.87 -14.97 -229.29 -1866.67 -74.10 -57.15
70 144
pre 394 6540 193 73 301 3673 103 31
post 824 13168 247 168 453 5289 156 63
3.40 3.07 1.51 2.69 3.34 3.34 3.17 3.05
429.41 6627.44 54.17 95.38 152.68 1615.64 52.69 32.40
108.02 1428.33 0.00 0.00 47.08 711.67 0.00 0.00
3.84 3.93 0.83 3.84 3.79 1.94 2.42 1.83
mean
t value
t value
mean
median
t value
number of sample
Between-periods change
mean
copayment rate rose          (patient-1)
copayment rate fell          (patient-2)
Between-periods change
mean
Between-periods change
number of sample
mean
Gastric Ulcer and the related
diagnoses
Cataract and the related diagnoses
copayment rate rose          (patient-1)
number of sample
copayment rate fell          (patient-2)
mean
Between-periods change
Between-period fee difference
Between-period fee difference
mean
median
t value
Between-period fee difference
mean
t value
median
number of sample
Between-period fee difference
t value
median
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Table 5: Tests According to Disease (continued)
Hospital A Hospital B
Points
per visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Medication Laboratory
test
Points
per visit
Expected fee
per month
(yen)
Laboratory
test
Diagnostic
Imaging
pre 1276 22764 782 187 994 11984 244 198
post 1289 22834 810 175 712 8658 184 115
0.36 0.09 1.18 -1.64 -2.04 -2.01 -2.68 -2.63
13.36 70.79 28.37 -11.78 -282.04 -3326.35 -59.44 -83.09
0.87 -602.5 1.28 -3.97 -148.09 -1887.08 -19.62 -30.41
pre 391 6745 204 78 308 4549 107 34
post 694 12294 265 132 385 5684 124 64
3.02 3.24 1.81 2.90 3.02 3.24 1.81 2.90
302.68 5548.95 60.96 53.40 77.47 1135.46 17.23 30.40
66.49 1684.58 1.75 4.84 19.99 315.42 0.00 0.00
3.10 3.76 1.06 4.48 4.00 4.64 3.81 4.43
pre 1525 25368 809 236 858 12730 289 90
post 1517 25739 831 206 734 10045 274 65
-0.13 0.35 0.76 -2.96 -1.48 -1.74 -0.62 -1.07
-7.70 371.04 21.67 -30.54 -124.02 -2685.31 -14.42 -24.14
8.76 -498.33 1.83 -13.33 -75.63 -1591.67 -7.27 -7.03
pre 381 5839 154 101 364 5277 182 23
post 705 11219 236 219 512 7024 204 56
4.33 2.66 1.79 3.75 3.02 3.19 1.58 1.95
324.04 5380.21 82.05 117.81 148.40 1746.48 22.40 33.44
109.98 1443.75 0.25 21.38 23.23 514.17 9.90 0.00
4.66 2.69 1.36 5.04 3.41 3.27 1.91 2.73
median
t value
mean
median
t value
mean
Between-period fee difference
t value
mean
Between-periods change
mean
copayment rate rose          (patient-1)
number of sample
copayment rate fell          (patient-2)
number of sample
1052 96
81 153
mean
t value
copayment rate fell          (patient-2)
number of sample
Diabetes Mellites
1036 155
129 503
t value
mean
median
Hypertension
copayment rate rose          (patient-1)
number of sample
Between-periods change
Between-period fee difference
Between-periods change
mean
t value
median
Between-period fee difference
Between-period fee difference
Between-periods change
mean
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